Suppose it is possible to make approximate interpersonal comparisons of welfare gains and losses. Thus, if w, x, y, and z are personal psychophysical states (each encoding all ethically relevant information about the physical and mental state of a person), then it sometimes possible to say, "The welfare gain of the state change w ❀ x is greater than the welfare gain of the state change y ❀ z." We can represent this by the formula "(w ❀ x) (y ❀ z)", where ( ) is a difference preorder: an incomplete preorder on the space of all possible personal state changes. A social state change is a bundle of personal state changes. A social difference preorder (SDP) is an incomplete preorder on the space of social state changes, which satisfies Pareto and Anonymity axioms. The minimal SDP is the natural extension of the Suppes-Sen preorder to this setting; we show it is a subrelation of every other SDP. The approximate utilitarian SDP ranks social state changes by comparing the sum total utility gain they induce, with respect to all 'utility functions' compatible with ( ). The net gain preorder ranks social state changes by comparing the aggregate welfare gain they induce upon various subpopulations. We show that, under certain conditions, all three of these preorders coincide.
Many rules for measuring social welfare or making collective choices rely on interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing. These interpersonal comparisons are fraught with difficulties, both philosophical and practical (Elster and Roemer, 1991; Fleurbaey and Hammond, 2004) , and have sometimes been rejected as impossible or even meaningless (Robbins, 1935 (Robbins, , 1938 , for example). However, many of these problems arise from an insistence on 'precise' interpersonal comparisons. Such precision may be impossible, but it is also unnecessary. Sen (1970a and Ch.7* of 1970b , Fine (1975) , Blackorby (1975) , Basu (1980, Ch.6 ), Shapley (2006, 2008) and Pivato (2010a,b,c) have shown that it is often possible to make rough social evaluations using only 'approximate' interpersonal comparisons of utility. The present paper extends this approach.
Every person has both a 'physical' state (e.g. her health and wealth) and a 'psychological' state (e.g. her beliefs, desires, and personality). Like Pivato (2010a,b,c) , this paper supposes that both physical states and the psychological states are mutable, and hence, potential targets of individual or collective choice. (For example: economic policies and safety regulations influence people's physical states. Policies which subsidize or regulate education, arts and cultural industries, mental health care, and psychopharmaceuticals influence people's psychological states.) Interpersonal comparisons rank the welfare of different psychophysical states -either of different people, or of the same person at different moments in time. Not all interpersonal comparisons are possible, but some certainly are (otherwise even individual intertemporal choice would be impossible).
Formally, let X be a space of 'psychophysical states'. An element x ∈ X encodes all information about an individual's psychology (i.e. her personality, mood, knowledge, beliefs, memories, values, desires, etc.) and also all information about her personal physical state (i.e. her health, wealth, personal property, physical location, consumption bundle, sense-data, etc.).
1 Any person, at any moment in time, resides at some point in X . Pivato (2010a,b,c) supposes that it is (sometimes) possible to compare the welfare levels of different psychophysical states: there is an (incomplete) preorder ( ) on X , such that, for any x, y ∈ X , the statement "x y" means that the welfare level of psychophysical state x is at least as high as that of y.
2
The present paper, in contrast, supposes we can compare not absolute welfare levels, but rather, welfare changes. Thus, we can (sometimes) make sense of the statement:
3 "The welfare improvement in moving from psychophysical state x 1 to state x 2 is greater than the welfare improvement in moving from state y 1 to y 2 ."
(1)
We can represent this with an (incomplete) preorder ( ) on the Cartesian product X × X . We will write an ordered pair (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X × X as "x 1 ❀ x 2 " to emphasize that it represents a change from x 1 to x 2 . Then statement (1) is represented by the formula "(x 1 ❀ x 2 ) ≻ (y 1 ❀ y 2 )".
A social policy will change the psychophysical states of many people; some will gain in welfare, while others will lose. Using the preorder ( ), this paper shows how to compare and aggregate the welfare costs and benefits imposed upon different people, and identify the social policy which causes the greatest aggregate welfare enhancement. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces notation and terminology. Section 2 axiomatizes and discusses difference preorders: preorders on X × X which encode statements like (1). Section 3 then defines a social difference preorder (SDP) to be a preorder on the space of social state changes which satisfies weak versions of the Pareto and Anonymity axioms. A key examples is the family of quasiutilitarian SDPs, which rank two state changes by 1 Unlike Pivato (2010a) , this model does not assume it is possible to cleanly separate someone's 'psychological' state from her 'physical' state. Indeed, if the mind is a function of the brain, then her psychological state is simply one aspect of her physical state.
2 For example, ( ) could represent the 'extended preferences' of Harsanyi (1955, fn.16 on p.316; 1977b, p.53 of §4.2) , Sen (1970a, p.152 of §9*1) and Arrow (1977) , or it could represent the 'fundamental preferences' of Kolm (1994a Kolm ( ,b, 1995 Kolm ( , 2002 3 For example, a 'preferencist' interpretation of this statement would be that a (
2 ) lottery between outcomes y 1 and x 2 is preferable to a ( 2 ) lottery between x 1 and y 2 . Note that it is not necessary to have a complete system of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries to make such judgements; it is only necessary to have reasonably consistent preferences over ( 1 2 , 1 2 ) lotteries -e.g. the 'quasicardinal' utility functions of (Basu, 1980, Ch.6 ).
comparing their utilitarian sums with respect to some list of utility functions compatible with ( ). Our first main result (Theorem 3.2) says that these are the only SDPs which can be represented by social welfare functions. Section 4 introduces the minimal SDP, which is a subrelation of every other SDP (Proposition 4.1). Our second major result (Theorem 4.2) says that, under certain conditions, the minimal SDP is the approximate utilitarian SDP -the quasiutilitarian SDP defined by the list of all utility functions compatible with ( ). Next, Section 5 introduces the net gain preorder, which is also a subrelation of every SDP (Proposition 5.2). The third main result, Theorem 5.1, says that, under certain hypotheses, the net gain preorder is the minimal SDP.
Section 6 applies the SDP concept to a simple model of redistributive wealth transfers. Section 7 discusses necessary and sufficient condition for an 'empathy' hypothesis which appears in Theorems 4.2 and 5.1. Appendix A contains the proofs of all results. Appendix B discusses complete extensions of difference preorders; it provides counterexamples to the analogues of Szpilrajn's Lemma and the Dushnik-Miller theorem.
Previous literature. , Suppes and Winet (1955) , Scott and Suppes (1958) , Debreu (1958) , Pfanzagl (1968) and Krantz et al. (1971) used (complete) difference preorders to construct cardinal utility representations for individual preferences. Later, Sarin (1978, 1979a,b) , Harvey (1999) and Harvey and Østerdal (2010) studied the utilitarian aggregation of such individual difference preorders into a (complete) social difference preorder.
4 Theorem 3.2 of this paper is roughly comparable to these earlier results. However, the main goal of this paper is to grapple with imperfect interpersonal comparability, in the spirit of Sen (1970a Sen ( ,b, 1972 , Fine (1975) , Blackorby (1975) , Basu (1980) , Shapley (2006, 2008) and Pivato (2010a,b,c) . Thus, all the results are formulated in terms of incomplete difference preorders, and many do not assume the existence of a cardinal utility representation.
Preliminaries
Let S be a set. A preorder on S is a binary relation ( ) which is transitive (for all r, s, t ∈ S, (r s t) =⇒ (r t)) and reflexive (for all s ∈ S, s s), but not necessarily complete or antisymmetric. The symmetric part of ( ) is the relation (≈) defined by (s ≈ t) ⇔ (s t and t s). The antisymmetric part of ( ) is the relation (≻) defined by (s ≻ t) ⇔ (s t and t s). The preorder ( ) is complete if, for all s, t ∈ S, either s t or t s. Most of the preorders considered in this paper are incomplete.
Let ( ). However, in general the two concepts do not coincide.
Difference preorders
Let ( ) be a preorder on X × X , intended to compare the welfare gains or losses imposed by different psychophysical state changes. Thus, the formula "(x 1 ❀ x 2 ) ≻ (y 1 ❀ y 2 )"
translates into statement (1) above. The preorder ( ) must satisfy four consistency conditions:
(DP0) For all x, y ∈ X , we have (x ❀ x) ≈ (y ❀ y).
(DP2) For all x 0 , x 1 , x 2 and y 0 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ X , if (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) (y 0 ❀ y 1 ) and (
(DP3) For all x 0 , x 1 , x 2 and y 0 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ X , if (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) (y 1 ❀ y 2 ) and (
A preorder on X × X satisfying conditions (DP0)-(DP3) will be called a difference preorder on X . Condition (DP0) means that all 'null changes' are equally worthless. Condition (DP1) says that if one change is better than another, then the reversal of the first change is worse than the reversal of the second. Condition (DP2) prevents 'composition inconsistencies', where the composition of two apparently superior small changes yields an inferior large change. Condition (DP3) says that the logic of (DP2) is commutative: when aggregating the net gain of two state changes, the order doesn't matter.
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Example 2.1. Let V be a collection of real-valued ('utility') functions on X . For any
We will now generalize the construction of Example 2.1. A linearly ordered abelian group is a triple (R, +, >), where R is a set, + is an abelian group operation on R, and > is a complete, antisymmetric, transitive binary relation on R such that, for all r, s ∈ R, if r > 0, then r + s > s. (Here, 0 denotes the identity element of R.) For example: the set R of real numbers is a linearly ordered abelian group (with the standard ordering and addition operator). So is any subgroup of R (e.g. the group Q of rational numbers). For any n ∈ N, the space R n is a linearly ordered abelian group under vector addition and the lexicographic order.
A weak utility function is a function u : X −→R (for some linearly ordered abelian group R) such that, for all x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ X ,
(For example, let V and ( V ) be as in Example 2.1; then any element of V is a weak utility function for ( V ).) If ( ) is a complete difference preorder, then the "=⇒" in (2) becomes "⇐⇒". In this case, Sarin (1978, 1979a,b) call u a measurable value function for ( ), while Harvey (1999) and Harvey and Østerdal (2010) call it a worth function.
There are three reasons for allowing utility functions to range over arbitrary linearly ordered abelian groups, rather than restricting them to the real numbers. First, at a technical level, this significantly extends the generality of our results, and simplifies many proofs. Second, at a philosophical level, it allows for 'non-Archimidean' or 'lexicographical' preferences, where some desires are given infinite priority over other desires. (We do not take a descriptive or normative stance on whether people can or should have such preferences, but nor do we wish to exclude them a priori.) Finally: non-real-valued utility functions arise naturally in the setting of infinite-horizon intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty (Pivato, 2011) .
Let U( ) be the set of all weak utility functions for ( ). We say ( ) has a multiutility representation if there is some subset U ′ ⊆ U( ) such that, for all x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ X ,
For example, the preorder ( V ) in Example 2.1 obviously admits a multiutility representation (set U ′ := V). Clearly, we can always assume U ′ = U( ) in (3); however, sometimes it will be convenient to use a smaller set of utility functions.
If ( ) is a complete difference preorder, then any multiutility representation for ( ) can be reduced to a utility representation for ( ): a single function u : X −→R such that "⇐⇒" holds in formula (2). Sufficient conditions for the existence of (real-valued) utility representations of complete difference preorders have been given by , 6 Suppes and Winet (1955, §5), Scott and Suppes (1958, pp.121-122) , Debreu (1958) , Pfanzagl (1968, Ch.9) and Krantz et al. (1971) . Suppose { ℓ } ℓ∈L is a collection of such complete difference preorders on X (where L is some indexing set), and suppose, for all ℓ ∈ L, that u ℓ is a utility representation for ( ℓ ) (perhaps obtained using the aforementioned literature).
If ( ) is the intersection of { ℓ } ℓ∈L , then ( ) is an (incomplete) difference preorder, with a multiutility representation given by U ′ := {u ℓ } ℓ∈L . A strong utility function for ( ) is a function u : X −→R which satisfies condition (2), and also such that, for all x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ X , we have
6 See also (Camacho, 1980 , §3) for a summary of Alt's model. Proposition 2.2 If a difference preorder has a multiutility representation (3), then it has a strong utility function.
Not all difference preorders admit a multiutility representation (3), or even a strong utility function. See Appendix B for details.
Social difference preorders
Let I be a finite or infinite set, indexing a population. A social state is an element x ∈ X I , which assigns a psychophysical state x i ∈ X to each i ∈ I.
7 Suppose the current social state is x 0 . Any policy will result in a change to some other social state; to decide on the best policy, the social planner must be able to compare the social value of one social state change (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) with another social state change (x 0 ❀ x 2 ). Or suppose the society splits into two subgroups of equal ethical importance (both indexed by I). Call these groups Ex and Wy, and suppose they are initially in states x 0 and y 0 , respectively. One policy will change Ex to state x 1 and leave Wy unchanged. The other policy will change Wy to state y 1 and leave Ex alone. Which policy is better? (Alternately, suppose there is only one population, but the initial state is unknown, so the planner faces a risky decision. Now let Ex and Wy represent two equally probable states of nature). To answer these questions, the social planner needs a difference preorder on the space X I of social states. A finitary permutation of I is a bijection π : I−→I admitting some finite subset J ⊆ I such that π(i) = i for all i ∈ I \ J . Let Π be the group of all finitary permutations of I. (If I is finite, then every permutation is finitary; then Π is simply the group of all permutations of I.) For any π ∈ Π and x ∈ X I , we define π(x) := [x π(i) ] i∈I ∈ X I . Given an interpersonal difference preorder ( ) on X , a ( )-social difference preorder (SDP) is a preorder ( ) on X I which satisfies the following axioms:
(Anon) For any x ∈ X I and π ∈ Π, (x ❀ x) (x ❀ π(x)).
(DP0 ) For all x, y ∈ X I , we have (x ❀ x) (y ❀ y).
7 Obviously, the living population of finite universe will always be finite. But we allow I to be infinite to accommodate variable populations, risk, and/or intergenerational justice. For example, we could set I := P × T , where P is a finite set of placeholders, and where T is an infinite set of time periods (to model nondiscounted, infinite-horizon intertemporal social choice), or where T is an infinite of equally probable 'states of nature' (to model risk). An element of X I thus assigns a psychophysical state x p,t to each placeholder p, in every time/state t. Allowing I to be infinite thus greatly extends the scope of the model. But it also increases the technical complexity to some of the definitions and proofs. It may be helpful to simply assume I is finite during a first reading.
8 Not all social states or all social state changes are feasible, of course. But a normative theory can make ethical judgements even about non-feasible alternatives. Thus, we define the SDP ( ) on all of X I × X I , and not just on some feasible subset.
Axioms (DP0 )-(DP3 ) are the analogs of (DP0)-(DP3), reflecting the fact that ( ) compares the social value of social state changes, rather than the social states themselves. Axiom (WPar) is a weak Pareto axiom. We will sometimes consider SDPs which also satisfy the 'Strong Pareto' axiom:
Axiom (Anon) is a weak form of 'anonymity' or 'impartiality', which reflects the fact that the elements of I are merely 'placeholders', with no intrinsic psychological content. All information about the 'psychological identity' of individual i is encoded in x i . Thus, for any x, y ∈ X I and i, j ∈ I, if x i = y j , then x i and y j are in every sense the same person (even though this person has different indices in the two social alternatives). Thus, x and π(x) represent the 'same' social alternative: permuting the indices is ethically irrelevant. Thus, (Anon) asserts that a social state change which simply permutes indices is no different than no change at all.
9 If I is finite, then axiom (Anon) applies to all permutations of I. However, if I is infinite, then (Anon) is restricted to 'finitary' permutations. This restriction is necessary: requiring ( ) to be invariant under all permutations of I leads to a contradiction with axiom (SPar).
10
Quasiutilitarian SDPs. Let V ⊆ U( ) be a nonempty set. For any
such that:
9 See (Pivato, 2010b, §3) for further discussion of the normative significance of (Anon). 10 For example, suppose X = R with the usual (complete) ordering, let I = Z, and define x, y, z ∈ X I as follows: x i := i − 1, y i := i, and z i := i + 1 for all i ∈ X I . Thus, the transition (y ❀ z) strictly improves every person's state, whereas (y ❀ x) strictly worsens every person's state. Define π : Z−→Z by π(i) := i + 1. Then π(x) = y and π(y) = z, so if ( ) was π-invariant, then we would have (y ❀ x) (y ❀ y) (y ❀ z), which is both intuitively absurd, and logically inconsistent with axiom (SPar). See Basu and Mitra (2003, 2006) and Fleurbaey and Michel (2003; Theorem 1) for further analysis of the Pareto/anonymity conflict.
In particular, we define the approximate utilitarian SDP (
. Thus, we can make J v arbitrarily large in (AU1). In particular, if I is finite, then we can simply set J v := I for all v ∈ V; then statement (AU2) becomes vacuous.) Proposition 3.1 Let ( ) be a difference preorder on X .
(b) If V contains a strong utility function for ( ), or V yields a multiutility representation for ( ), then ( (e) If ( ) has any strong utility functions, then ( u ) satisfies axiom (SPar).
In general, U( ) will be large, and ( u ) will be incomplete. By restricting to a smaller set V ⊂ U( ), we can obtain a more complete SDP ( V ). We might do this for technical reasons or normative reasons. At a technical level, perhaps we only wish to consider elements of U( ) which satisfy certain 'regularity' conditions. (For example, if X is a topological space, we might only be interested in the continuous elements of U( ).) At a normative level, perhaps some of the utility functions in U( ) encode information which we think is 'ethically irrelevant' and should be ignored. Or perhaps we wish to give some information more 'weight' than other information. For example, let u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u N : X −→R be a set of functions measuring N components of 'quality of life', such as health, education, security, liberty, social participation, consumption of various commodities, etc. Let U ′ be the set of all positive linear combinations of u 1 , . . . , u N . If u 1 , . . . , u N ∈ U( ), then U ′ ⊆ U( ). But perhaps we want to give component 1 twice the weight of component 2, and six times the weight of component 3, while excluding components 4 and 5 altogether. We could do this with the quasiutilitarian SDP ( V ), where V := {6u 1 + 3u 2 + u 3 , u 6 , u 7 , . . . , u N }.
When is an SDP quasiutilitarian? Let ( ) be a ( )-SDP, and let (R, +, >) be a linearly ordered abelian group. An R-valued social welfare function (SWF) for ( ) is a function W : X I −→R which is a weak utility function for ( ). That is: for any
A collection W of SWFs yields a multiwelfare representation for ( ) if, for any
We now come to our first major result.
Theorem 3.2 Let I be finite. An ( )-SDP on X I admits a multiwelfare representation if and only if it is quasiutilitarian.
For example, suppose ( ) and ( ) are complete difference preorders, and can be represented by a single real-valued utility function u and a single real-valued SWF W , respectively. Then Theorem 3.2 says that W (x) = i∈I u(x i ), so that ( ) is equivalent to the classic utilitarian social welfare order. This conclusion is very similar to Theorem 1 of Dyer and Sarin (1979a) , Theorem 6 of Harvey and Østerdal (2010) , or the main result of Harvey (1999) . However, Theorem 3.2 also applies to incomplete preorders and non-real-valued utility functions.
Theorem 3.2 is only applicable when I is finite. Also, not all SDPs admit a multiwelfare representation. The rest of this paper investigates the behaviour of SDPs when the hypotheses of Theorem 3.2 are not necessarily satisfied.
The minimal SDP
An ( )-SDP is not necessarily a complete preorder on X I × X I . Furthermore, there may be many different ( )-SDPs, based on different ethical principles, which disagree on how to trade off between the interests of different individuals. It is thus desirable to find the common ground between these different SDPs. It is easy to see that the intersection of two or more SDPs is also an SDP. Let SDP be the set of all ( )-social difference preorders on X I (we will see soon that this set is always nonempty). Define the minimal SDP: ( * ) := ( )∈SDP ( ). In other words, for any x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ X I , we have
Proposition 4.1 Let ( ) be a difference preorder on X , and let ( ) be an ( )-SDP. Unfortunately, definition (6) is nonconstructive, and thus, not very useful in practice. We now provide a more explicit and practical characterization of the minimal SDP ( * ). Say ( ) is empathic if, for any x 1 , x 2 , y 1 ∈ X , there exists y 2 ∈ X such that (x 1 ❀ x 2 )≈(y 1 ❀ y 2 ). In other words: for any possible state transition facing a person currently in state x 1 , a person in state y 1 can imagine an exactly analogous transition for herself. (Necessary and sufficient conditions for empathy are given in §7.) Here is our second major result.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose ( ) is empathic, and has a multiutility representation (3) given by some subset V ⊆ U( ). If either I is finite or V is finite, then (
Example 4.3. Suppose X = R N , where the different coordinates represent different quantitative measures of well-being (e.g. health, education, etc.). For any x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ X , suppose (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) (y 1 ❀ y 2 ) if and only if (x 2 − x 1 ) ≥ (y 2 − y 1 ) (where "≥" is the coordinatewise dominance relation). Then ( ) is empathic. Furthermore, the N coordinate projections on R N provide a finite multiutility representation for ( ); thus, Theorem 4.2 says that ( u ) is the 'core' of every other ( )-SDP on X I .
In particular, if N = 1 (i.e. X = R), then ( ) is a complete order on X × X . In this case, U( ) is simply the set of affine increasing functions from R to itself, so that ( u ) is equivalent to the classic utilitarian social welfare order:
(if I is finite). In this case, Theorem 4.2 implies that ( u ) is the unique SDP on X I satisfying axiom (SPar).
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♦
For any x ∈ X , z ∈ X I , and j ∈ I, we define (
) ∈ X I by setting (
We say that ( ) exhibits no extra hidden interpersonal comparisons if the following holds:
Note that the "=⇒" direction of (NEHIC) follows immediately from axiom (WPar). The real content of (NEHIC) lies in the "⇐=" direction. Intuitively, if ((
welfare gain than (y ❀ y ′ ). Axiom (NEHIC) says that ( ) can only make such judgements when they are justified by the underlying difference preorder ( ). clear that the set SDP is nonempty; hence it is not clear that the minimal SDP ( * ) is well-defined. We will now provide an alternative, inductive definition of ( * ). First, define an equivalence relation ( an ) on X I × X I by:
Let ( par ) be the Pareto preorder. That is:
Let ( * ) be the closure of the relation ( an ) ∪ ( par ) under transitivity, (DP2), and (DP3).
That is: for any
Conditions ( * 1)-( * 3) correspond to a social preorder proposed by Suppes and Sen.
12 Conditions ( * 4) and ( * 5) ensure satisfaction of axioms (DP2 ) and (DP3 ).
Proposition 4.5 The relation ( * ) defined using rules ( * 1)-( * 5) is the minimal SDP defined by formula (6).
Net Gain
For any x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ X I , and any finite subsets J , K ⊆ I with J := |J | and K := |K|, we write "(
12 See Suppes (1966) , Sen (1970b, §9*1- §9*3, pp.150-156), Saposnik (1983) and Pivato (2010b, §3.1).
Intuitively, w 0 ❀ w J aggregates the net welfare gain of the chain w 0 ❀ w 1 ❀ w 2 ❀ · · · ❀ w J . Thus, (JK1) implies that net welfare gain for the J -population induced by the change x 1 ❀ x 2 is at least as large as the net welfare gain of w 0 ❀ w J . Meanwhile, (JK2) implies that the net welfare gain for the K-population induced by y 1 ❀ y 2 is at most as large as z 0 ❀ z K . Thus, if (JK3) holds, then the J -population, in aggregate, gains more welfare from x 1 ❀ x 2 than the K-population gains from y 1 ❀ y 2 Let I 0 ⊆ I be a finite subset. A partition of I 0 is a collection {J ℓ } ℓ∈L of disjoint subsets of I 0 (where L is some indexing set), such that I 0 = ℓ∈L J ℓ . We define the net gain relation
some finite I 0 ⊆ I and two partitions {J ℓ } ℓ∈L and {K ℓ } ℓ∈L of I 0 (with the same indexing set L), such that:
Intuitively, condition (NG2) means we can split up I 0 into disjoint subsets such that, for each ℓ ∈ L, the 'net welfare gain' induced by x 1 ❀ x 2 for J ℓ is demonstrably larger than the 'net welfare gain' induced by y 1 ❀ y 2 for K ℓ (as argued in the previous paragraph). Thus, if we aggregate over all ℓ ∈ L, then the 'net welfare gain' over all of I 0 must be greater for x 1 ❀ x 2 than it is for y 1 ❀ y 2 . Meanwhile, condition (NG1) ensures that the people in I \ I 0 unanimously prefer
(If I is finite, then we can simply set I 0 := I, in which case condition (NG1) becomes vacuous.) Our last major result characterizes the minimal SDP ( * ) without assuming I is finite, or assuming the existence of any utility functions for ( ). Here is the last major result of the paper. 
6 Application: Redistributive transfers
Suppose X = P × R + , where P is a set of 'personality types', and where the state p, r ∈ P ×R + represents a p-type person holding r dollars. We suppose p encodes all psychological or physical characteristics which influence the marginal welfare which money provides for a p-type person. The social planner can only approximately compare the marginal welfare of money for different personality types. However, we assume everyone obtains qualitatively similar benefits from money, which we model using a nondecreasing 'benefit function' β : R + −→R. Formally, for any p 1 , p 2 ∈ P, we suppose there is some constant C = C(p 1 , p 2 ) ≥ 1 such that, for any r 1 < s 1 and r 2 < s 2 in R + , we have
(Of course, C(p, p) = 1 for all p ∈ P). We will use this simple model to investigate the social benefit of wealth redistribution. For simplicity, suppose I contains {1, 2} ('Juan' and 'Sue'), and fix p ∈ P I . Let C := C(p 1 , p 2 ), and consider a social state p, r ∈ P I × R I + , where r 1 < r 2 (so Juan is poorer than Sue). A redistributive transfer is a change p, r ❀ p, s , where r i = s i for all i ∈ {1, 2}, and r 1 ≤ s 1 ≤ s 2 ≤ r 2 , and where
(The gap (r 1 + r 2 ) − (s 1 + s 2 ) represents the efficiency loss caused by the transfer -due to labour disincentive effects on Juan and Sue, the costs of managing and enforcing the necessary system of taxes and subsidies, and/or waste and corruption in the government.)
13
The 'status quo' option is simply the 'null' transfer p, r ❀ p, r . Under what conditions is redistribution socially superior to the status quo?
14 If ( ) is any
Example 6.2. Suppose β(r) = log 2 (r) for all r ∈ R + , and let C := 2 in statement (7). Let r 1 := 128 and r 2 := 2047. Let s 1 := 513 and s 2 := 1024. Thus, the transfer p, r ❀ p, s taxes $1023 from Sue, and gives $385 to Juan (we suppose the other $638 is lost due to inefficiencies). Let r ′ 2 := 2048. Then r ′ 2 > r 2 , and
Thus, any SDP will say that this wealth transfer is socially superior to the status quo, despite the large efficiency loss and the imprecise interpersonal utility comparisons. ♦ 13 Some transfers, such as public education or public vaccination campaigns, subsidize activities with positive externalities, so that, in effect, s 1 + s 2 ≥ r 1 + r 2 . But we will ignore this possibility.
14 Note: since r ′ 2 − s 2 ≥ r 2 − s 2 ≥ s 1 − r 1 , and C ≥ 1, this inequality means that the average slope of β between r 2 and s 2 is smaller than its average slope between r 1 and s 1 . This is consistent with the standard assumption that the marginal benefit of wealth is declining.
Empathy
Theorems 4.2, 4.4, and 5.1 illustrate the importance of empathy. What are necessary and sufficient conditions for a difference preorder to be empathic?
Let J be an indexing set (possibly infinite), let {R j } j∈J be a collection of linearly ordered abelian groups, and for all j ∈ J , let u j : X −→R j . Let U ′ := {u j } j∈J , and suppose ( ) has a multiutility representation (3). Define R := j∈J R j (with the product group structure), and define u : X −→R by u(x) := (u j (x)) j∈J for all x ∈ X . Let u(X ) := {u(x); x ∈ X } (a subset of R). Recall that u(X ) is a coset in R if there is some subgroup S ⊆ R and some r ∈ R such that u(X ) := r + S.
Proposition 7.1 Suppose ( ) has a multiutility representation (3), and define u : X −→R as above. Then ( ) is empathic if and only if u(X ) is a coset in R.
Example 7.2. (a) Suppose ( ) is a complete difference preorder on X , defined by a single utility function u : X −→R so that (
An endomorphism of ( ) is a function α : X −→X such that, for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ X , if y 1 := α(x 1 ) and y 2 := α(x 2 ), then (x 1 ❀ x 2 )≈(y 1 ❀ y 2 ). Psychologically speaking, α defines a perfect analogy (in terms of welfare gains) between all state changes available to x 1 and those available to y 1 .
The composition of two endomorphisms is also an endomorphism. Thus, if End( ) is the set of all endomorphisms of ( ), then End( ) is a monoid. 15 We say that End( ) acts transitively on X if, for any x, y ∈ X , there exists α ∈ End( ) such that α(x) = y. Proposition 7.3 Let ( ) be a difference preorder. Then ( ) is empathic if and only if End( ) acts transitively on X .
Conclusion
It is reasonable to suppose that we can make at least approximate comparisons between the welfare gains and losses which different people experience under changes in the social state. Using even such an approximate interpersonal comparison scheme, it is possible to define a nontrivial (albeit incomplete) ranking of social state changes. This allows the social planner to judge that some state changes are clearly better than others (although there may be no unique optimum). In particular, even a very incomplete system of interpersonal comparisons can be enough to show that some wealth transfers improve social welfare relative to the status quo (Proposition 6.1).
We have defined three social ranking schemes. One, ( u ), is a straightforward generalization of the classic utilitarian social welfare order. Another, ( * ), is a generalization of the Suppes-Sen ordering, and forms the logical core of every social ranking system compatible with our axioms (Proposition 4.1). The third, ( ng ), ranks social state changes by comparing the aggregate costs/benefits they impose upon different sub-populations in a 'quasi-utilitarian' fashion; it is a sub-relation of ( * ) (Proposition 5.2(b)). Under reasonable hypotheses, all three schemes are in fact equal (Theorems 4.2 and 4.4). This makes the approximate utilitarian scheme ( u ) attractive as a basis for social choice. We end with some open questions.
• The 'empathy' hypothesis of Theorems 4.2, 4.4 and 5.1 is somewhat restrictive. Do the conclusions hold under a weaker condition?
• Aside from ( * ) and ( u ), are there any interesting and natural SDPs admitting axiomatic characterizations?
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Let J be an indexing set (possibly infinite), let {R j } j∈J be a collection of linearly ordered abelian groups, and for all j ∈ J , let u j : X −→R j . Let U ′ := {u j } j∈J , and suppose ( ) has a multiutility representation (3).
Let (≫) be a well-ordering of J . Let R := j∈J R j , and let (+) be the componentwise addition operator on R. Let r, s ∈ R, with r = s. Since (J , ≫) is well-ordered, the set {j ∈ J ; r j = s j } has a minimal element; call this element j * (r, s). Define the lexicographical order (>) on R as follows: for any r = s ∈ R, if j = j * (r, s), then r > s if and only if r j > j s j (where (> j ) is the order on R j ). It is easy to verify that (R, +, >) is a linearly ordered abelian group. Now, define u : X −→R by u(x) := (u j (x)) j∈J for all x ∈ X . I claim that u is a strong utility function. If (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) (y 1 ❀ y 2 ), then (3) says that u(
Furthermore, if (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) ≻ (y 1 ❀ y 2 ), then (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) (y 1 ❀ y 2 ), so the contrapositive of (3) says that it is false that u(
Proof of Proposition 3.1. (a) The reflexive property follows from axiom (WPar), which, in turn, follows immediately by setting J v := ∅ for all v ∈ V, and applying (AU2) to every element of I.
(Anon) Let π ∈ Π. Let J ⊆ I be a finite subset such that π(i) = i for all i ∈ I \ J . Let x ∈ X I , and let x ′ = π(x). Then for all v ∈ V, we have
Here, ( * ) is by the change of variables j ′ := π(j) (because π : J −→J bijectively). If we set J v := J , then this verifies (AU1) in both directions. Meanwhile, we obviously have
. Let v ∈ V, and suppose v : X −→R, where R is some linearly ordered abelian group. By hypothesis, there exist finite subsets
and (y
Here, (A5) is obtained by combining (A1), (A3), and (2). Likewise, (A6) is obtained by combining (A2), (A4), and (2). Next, (A7) follows from (A3),
and (
Here, (A9) is obtained be combining (A5) and (A6) using the transitivity of the ordering on R. Meanwhile (A10) is obtained by combining (A7) and (A8), using the transitivity of ( ). Now, (A9) verifies (AU1), while (A10) verifies (AU2). We can do this for any v ∈ V; thus, (
(DP2 ) The argument is closely analogous to the proof of Transitivity.
Let v ∈ V, with v : X −→R. By hypothesis, there exist finite subsets
Here, (A15) is obtained by combining (A11), (A13), and (2). Likewise, (A16) is obtained by combining (A12), (A14), and (2). Next, (A17) follows from (A13), because
Here, ( * ) comes from combining (A15) and (A16) and using the compatibility between the ordering and the addition operator on R. Meanwhile (A20) comes from combining (A17) and (A18), and using axiom (DP2) for ( ). Now, (A19) verifies (AU1), while (A20) verifies (AU2). We can do this for any v ∈ V; thus, (
(DP3 ) The proof is very similar to (DP2 ).
(DP0 ) For any v ∈ V, set J v := ∅, and observe that (
, for all i ∈ I \ J v . Thus, (AU1) and (AU2) are satisfied. This holds for all v ∈ V; we conclude that (
First suppose V contains a strong utility function v 0 . Thus v 0 (x
. We will show that there is no finite subset J ⊆ I which satisfies (AU1) and (AU2) for v 0 in the way required to show that (
If j ∈ J , then j ∈ I \ J , and (x (AU2) is not satisfied. Thus, there exists at least one v ∈ V (namely v 0 ) such that (AU1) and (AU2) cannot both be satisfied. Thus, (
The proof in the case when V provides a multiutility representation is similar.
(d) follows immediately from (c), which in turn follows from the definitions of ( V ) and (
Finally, (e) follows from (b). ✷
The Proof of Theorem 3.2 uses the following result, which is of independent interest. Proposition A.1 Let I be finite, and let ( ) be a ( )-SDP on X I . If W : X I −→R is a SWF for ( ), then there exists some u ∈ U( ) and some constant C ∈ R such that
Proof: Let J , K ⊂ I be disjoint subsets, with I = J ⊔ K. For x, y ∈ X I , we define (
I by setting (
Fix some o ∈ X , and define o ∈ X I by o i := o for all i ∈ I. Now fix k ∈ I, and define u : X −→R by setting u(x) := W (
For any x, y ∈ X , z ∈ X I , and j ∈ I, we have W (
Proof: We have
Here, ( †) is by (Anon), and ( * ) is by (WPar), along with the fact that (DP0) says
Combining (4) with (A21), we obtain
Claim 2: u ∈ U( ). 
Here, ( * ) is by Claim 1. Thus, W (x) = C + i∈I u(x i ), as claimed. ✷ Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let ( ) be a ( )-SDP on X I .
"⇐=" Clearly, if ( ) is quasiutilitarian, it admits a multiwelfare representation.
"=⇒" Let W be a collection of SWFs yielding a multiwelfare representation for ( ).
For all W ∈ W, Proposition A.1 yields some v W ∈ U( ) such that, for all 
By contradiction, suppose (
The proofs of Proposition 4.1(b,c), Theorem 4.2 and Lemma A.5 (below) all depend on the next result.
Lemma A.3 Let ( ) be a preorder on X × X which satisfies (DP1) and (DP2). Let 
Proof: Part (a) follows from inductive application of (DP2). Part (c) follows from a similar inductive application of both (DP3) and (DP2).
It suffices to prove part (b) in the case N = 2; the proof for longer chains can then be derived by applying the case N = 2 and performing induction on chain length. There are two cases.
First, suppose (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) (y 0 ❀ y 1 ) and (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) ≻ (y 1 ❀ y 2 ). We must show that (x 0 ❀ x 2 ) ≻ (y 0 ❀ y 2 ). Axiom (DP2) implies that (x 0 ❀ x 2 ) (y 0 ❀ y 2 ), so it suffices to show that (x 0 ❀ x 2 ) (y 0 ❀ y 2 ).
By contradiction, suppose (x 0 ❀ x 2 ) (y 0 ❀ y 2 ). Then (DP1) implies that (x 2 ❀ x 0 ) (y 2 ❀ y 0 ). This, together with hypothesis (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) (y 0 ❀ y 1 ) and (DP2), implies that (x 2 ❀ x 1 ) (y 2 ❀ y 1 ). Then (DP1) implies that (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) (y 1 ❀ y 2 ).
But this contradicts the hypothesis that (
A similar proof applies if (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) ≻ (y 0 ❀ y 1 ) and (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) (y 1 ❀ y 2 ).
The proof of part (d) is similar to part (b), but using (DP3) as well as (DP2). ✷
The proof of Proposition 4.1(a) follows immediately from defining formula (6). The proofs of Proposition 4.1(b,c) require Proposition 4.5, so we prove that first.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Let ( * ) be the SDP defined inductively by rules ( * 1)-( * 5).
Let (
• ) be the SDP defined by formula (6). We must show that ( * ) = ( 
Let ( ) be another ( )-SDP, and let
The proof is by induction, using the recursive definition of ( * ).
By induction, suppose we have already shown that (x 0 ❀ x 2 ) (y 0 ❀ y 2 ) and
( * 4) Suppose there exist
By induction, suppose we have already shown (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) (z 0 ❀ z 1 ) and (
By induction, suppose we have already shown (
By induction, we have ( 
It remains to show that ( ) refines ( *
through some sequence of applications of Steps ( * 1)-( * 5), but the same sequence does not yield (
. This means that in some application of Step ( * 2), we must have a strict " ⊲ par " rather than "
par ". Thus, we augment the proof of Proposition 4.5 "⊆" with the following additional observations:
By induction, suppose we have already shown that (x 0 ❀ x 2 ) ⊲ (y 0 ❀ y 2 ) and
By induction, suppose we have already shown that (
By induction, we conclude that ( (WPar) Let x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ X I , and suppose that (x
(Anon) Let x ∈ X I and π ∈ Π; we must show that (x ❀ π(x)) ng (x ❀ x). Since π is finitary, there exists some finite I 0 ⊆ I such that π(i) = i for all i ∈ I \ I 0 .
The π-orbits of distinct points in I 0 are either identical or disjoint; thus, they form a partition of I 0 . Thus, there is some finite indexing set L such that I 0 = ℓ∈L J ℓ , where for each ℓ ∈ L, we have
Proof: We will construct w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w J ℓ , z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z K ℓ ∈ X and bijections α ℓ :
, and define α ℓ :
for all k ∈ K ℓ , thereby verifying (JK2).
Finally, note that w
thereby verifying (JK3). This construction shows that (x ❀ π(x))
. But the exact same construction can be read backwards to show that (x ❀ π(x))
Now, for all i ∈ I \ I 0 , we have π(
(DP0 ) Let x, y ∈ X I . We must show that (x ❀ x) ng (y ❀ y). Let I 0 := ∅, so that (NG2) is vacuous. To verify (NG1), observe that, for all i ∈ I, we have (
(DP1 ) Let I 0 ⊆ I be finite, and let {J ℓ } ℓ∈L and {K ℓ } ℓ∈L be partitions of I 0 , such that (
(y 2 ❀ y 1 ) via the same partitions. To prove this, we must check (NG1) and (NG2).
(NG1) For all i ∈ I \ I 0 , we have (
. By applying (DP1) to (JK1)-(JK3), we get:
(y 2 ❀ y 1 ). We can do this for all ℓ ∈ L, thereby verifying (NG2).
We conclude that (
Proof of Proposition 5.2(b)
. Let x 1 , x 2 , y 2 , y 2 ∈ X I . Let I 0 ⊆ I be a finite subset, and let {J ℓ } ℓ∈L and {K ℓ } ℓ∈L be partitions of I 0 . Suppose (
partitions. We will show that (
For all ℓ ∈ L and n = 1, 2, let x
Likewise, since I 0 = ℓ∈L K ℓ , we can write (y ). For all ℓ ∈ L, suppose we write J ℓ := {j(ℓ, 1), j(ℓ, 2), . . . , j(ℓ, J ℓ )}, such that
where " are the elements of X I 0 defined as indicated above, then formula (A22) can be rewritten: (x
Thus, since the SDP ( ) satisfies axioms (WPar) and (Anon), we deduce that
Next, for all ℓ ∈ L, suppose we write
because the SDP ( ) satisfies axioms (WPar) and (Anon). Combining (A23), (A25) and (A29) through transitivity, we conclude that (
Refinement. Now suppose ( ) satisfies (SPar); we must show that ( ) refines ( ng ).
. Then there are three cases. Either
(ii) one of the " ".
(If none of these three cases are satisfied, then we would have (x
2 ), contradicting our hypothesis.)
In case (ii), (SPar) yields a strict social preference in formulae (A23) or (A25). In case (i) or (iii), the " par " in formula (A28) becomes a " ⊲ par "; then (SPar) yields a strict social preference in formula (A29). Either way, when we combine (A23), (A25) and (A29) through transitivity, we conclude that (
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We will show that (
that every SDP is an extension of ( V ), which means that (
. In particular, this will mean that (
, so this will imply that ( Note that J is finite, because either V is finite, or I itself is finite, by hypothesis.
Suppose J := {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j N }. Fix w 0 ∈ X . Applying empathy repeatedly, find
Fix z 0 ∈ X . Applying empathy repeatedly, find z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z N ∈ X such that
Claim 1:
Proof: For any v ∈ V, we have
Here, (⋄) is by (JK1 ′ ) and formula (2). Next, ( * ) is by (AU1). Finally, ( †) is by (JK2 ′ ) and formula (2).
Now, let L := {1} and set I 0 := J 1 := K 1 := J . Then observations (JK1 ′ ) and (JK2 ′ ) and Claim 1 together imply that (
Meanwhile, (AU2) implies that (x
The proof of Theorem 4.4 uses the next result. Proof: Let w, w ′ , z, z ′ ∈ X . Let x := (
), and y ′ := (
). For all v ∈ V, we have:
Here, ( * ) is by formula (A30), ( †) is by definition of ( V ), and (⋄) is by (NEHIC).
This holds for all w, w ′ , z, z ′ ∈ X ; Thus, V yields a multiutility representation for ( ).
"⇐=" Suppose V yields a multiutility representation for ( ). Then
Here, ( †) is by definition of ( V ) (recall that I is finite). Meanwhile, ( * ) is by formula (A30), and (⋄) is because V yields a multiutility representation for ( ).
This holds for all w, w ′ , z, z ′ ∈ X . Thus, ( 
Let I 0 := {1, 2}; then condition (NG1) holds because r i = s i for all i ∈ I \ {1, 2}. It remains to check (NG2). Let L := {1} and let J 1 := K 1 := I 0 ; we will show that (
by verifying conditions (JK1)-(JK3).
Define α(1) := 2 and α(2) := 1. Define w 0 := p 2 , r 2 ( = x 1 2 ), w 1 := p 2 , s 2 ( = x 2 2 ) and
which verifies (JK1). Here ( * ) is by formula (7), because
Now define β(1) := 1, β(2) := 2, and let
which verifies (JK2). Here, ( * ) is by (DP0). To check (JK3), observe that
where ( 
The proof of Theorem 5.1 uses the following result:
Lemma A.5 Suppose ( ) is empathic. For any x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ X I , the following are equivalent:
(c) There exists a finite subset N 0 ⊆ I such that, for any finite N ⊆ I with N 0 ⊆ N :
is the transitive closure of ( ng ).
"(c)=⇒(b)" If we set I 0 := N , set L := {1}, and set 
, and suppose inductively that we have obtained w 0 , . . . , w J ℓ ∈ X satisfying property (JK1 ′ ) for all n ∈ J 1 ⊔ J 2 ⊔ · · · ⊔ J ℓ−1 . Let j 1 ∈ J ℓ be such that α ℓ (j 1 ) = 1. Thus, α(j 1 ) = J ℓ + 1. Empathy yields some w J ℓ +1 ∈ X such that (w
Next, let j 2 ∈ J ℓ be such that α ℓ (j 2 ) = 2. Thus, α(j 2 ) = J ℓ + 2. Empathy yields some w J ℓ +2 ∈ X such that (w
Proceeding in this way, repeated application of empathy yields a collection {w α(j) ; j ∈ J ℓ } ⊂ X such that for all j ∈ J ℓ , we have (w
By induction, we obtain w 0 , . . . , w N ∈ X satisfying property (JK1 ′ ). An identical construction yields z 0 , . . . , z N ∈ X satisfying property (JK2 ′ ).
is indifferent to the corresponding link in the chain w
where ( * ) is by (JK3) for the relation (
Case 2. Let a 1 , a 2 , z 1 , z 2 ∈ X , and suppose (a Applying the argument of Case 1 to each link in the chain (A32), we get elements 
The left-hand relations in (A33) are by (JK2 ′ ); the right-hand relations in (A33) are by
The transitivity of ( ) collapses all but the first and last rows of (A33) into
Define
Applying a change of variables to each line in (A35) yields
Applying Lemma A.3(c) the relations in (A36) yields
The last row of (A33) says that Z 0 , Z 1 , . . . , Z N satisfies (JK2 ′ ) with respect to (z 1 ❀ z 2 ). Finally, combining (A34) and (A37) with transitivity, we get (A
We conclude that (a It remains to verify axioms (DP2 ), (DP3 ), and (SPar).
(SPar) Suppose that
We must show that (
. Then Lemma A.5 yields some finite subset N ⊆ I, with i 0 ∈ N , satisfying (NG1 ′ ) and (NG2 ′ ). Let N := |N |. Then (NG2 ′ ) yields some w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w N , z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z N ∈ X and bijections α, β :
Without loss of generality, assume that N = [1 . . . N ]. Fix w 0 , z 0 ∈ X arbitrarily. Repeated application of empathy yields w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N , z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z N ∈ X such that
Thus, transitivity and hypothesis (A38) imply that (
Meanwhile, combining (JK1 ′ ) and ( JK1) yields
Likewise, combining (JK2 ′ ) and ( JK2) yields
Thus, we have
Here, ( * ) is by applying Lemma A.3(c) to the relations in ( JK1 ′ ), and ( †) is by applying Lemma A.3(c) to the relations in ( JK2 ′ ). Finally (⋄) is by ( JK3).
Since (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) tng (y 0 ❀ y 1 ), Lemma A.5 yields some finite subset N 0 ⊆ I such that any superset of N 0 satisfies (NG1 ′ ) and (NG2 ′ ) for (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) and (y 0 ❀ y 1 ). Likewise, Lemma A.5 yields some finite subset N 1 ⊆ I such that any finite superset of N 1 satisfies (NG1 ′ ) and (NG2 ′ ) for (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) and (y 1 ❀ y 2 ). Thus, if N := N 0 ∪ N 1 , then N satisfies (NG1 ′ ) and (NG2 ′ ) for both. This means that
. Finally, empathy means that we can assume without loss of generality that w
. We can use (DP2) to combine this with (JK3 ′ ) and obtain: 
Thus, if we let α : N −→[1 . . . N ] be the identity map, then w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N verify property (JK1) for transition (
In a similar way, empathy yields z 0 , z1
Thus, for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], we have:
Thus, if we let β : N −→[1 . . . N ] be the identity map, then z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z N verify property (JK2) for transition (y 0 ❀ y 2 ).
Finally, every step in the chain
is indifferent (by construction) to a specific step in the chain The argument is very similar to the proof of (DP2 ); we will simply point out the differences. Formulae (JK1 ′ ), (JK3 ′ ), (JK1 ′′ ) and (JK3 ′′ ) remain exactly as before, but formulae (NG1 ′ ), (NG1 ′′ ), (JK2 ′ ), and (JK2 ′′ ) now become: Thus, if we let α, β : N −→[1 . . . N ] be the identity maps, then w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N verify property (JK1) for transition (x 0 ❀ x 2 ), while z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z N verify property (JK2) for transition (y 0 ❀ y 2 ). The rest of the proof proceeds as before. ✷ Let (R, +) be an abelian group. Recall that a subset C ⊆ R is a coset if there is some subgroup S ⊆ R and some r ∈ R such that C := r + S := {r + s; s ∈ S}.
Lemma A.6 Let (R, +) be an abelian group, and let C ⊆ R. Then C is a coset if and only if, for all c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ∈ C, we have (c 1 − c 2 + c 3 ) ∈ C.
Proof: "=⇒" Suppose C := r + S for some subgroup S ⊆ R and some r ∈ R. Then for any c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ∈ C, there exist s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ∈ S such that c 1 = r + s 1 , c 2 = r + s 2 , and c 3 = r + s 3 . Thus, c 1 − c 2 + c 3 = (r + s 1 ) − (r + s 2 ) + (r + s 3 ) = r + (s 1 − s 2 + s 3 ) = r + s, where s := s 1 −s 2 +s 3 is an element of S (because S is a group). Thus, (c 1 −c 2 +c 3 ) ∈ r+S = C, as desired.
"⇐=" Fix r ∈ C, and define S := {c − r; c ∈ C}.
Claim 1: S is a subgroup of R.
Proof: Let s 1 , s 2 ∈ S; we must show that s 1 − s 2 ∈ S. By definition, there exist c 1 , c 2 ∈ C such that s 1 = c 1 − r and s 2 = c 2 − r. But then s 1 − s 2 = (c 1 − r) − (c 2 − r) = c 1 − c 2 . Now, if c := c 1 − c 2 + r, then c ∈ C by hypothesis. Thus, c 1 − c 2 = c − r ∈ S, as desired.
Claim 2: C = r + S.
Proof: "⊆" Let c ∈ C; we must show that c ∈ r + S. If s := c − r, then s ∈ S. Thus, c = r + s ∈ r + S, as desired. "⊇" Let s ∈ S; we must show that r + s ∈ C. By definition, there exists c ∈ C such that s = c − r. But then r + s = c.
✸ Claim 2
It follows that C is a coset in R. ✷ Proof of Proposition 7.1. Let {R j } j∈J and U ′ := {u j } j∈J and u : X −→R be defined as prior to Proposition 7.1.
"=⇒" Let c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ∈ u(X ). By Lemma A.6, it suffices to show that c 1 − c 2 + c 3 ∈ u(X ) also. By definition, there exist x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ X such that c n = u(x n ) for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Since ( ) is empathic, there exists some x 4 such that (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) ≈ (x 3 ❀ x 4 ). But then the multiutility representation (3) implies that u(x 2 ) − u(x 1 ) = u(x 4 ) − u(x 3 ) for all u ∈ U ′ . In other words, u(x 2 ) − u(x 1 ) = u(x 4 ) − u(x 3 ). Thus, if c 4 := u(x 4 ), then we have c 4 ∈ u(X ), and c 4 = c 1 − c 2 + c 3 , as desired.
"⇐=" Let x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ X ; we must construct x 4 ∈ X such that (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) ≈ (x 3 ❀ x 4 ). Let c n = u(x n ) for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and let c 4 := c 1 − c 2 + c 3 . Now, c n ∈ u(X ) for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and u(X ) is a coset by hypothesis, so Lemma A.6 says that c 4 ∈ u(X ) also. Thus, there exists some x 4 ∈ X such that c 4 = u(x 4 ). This means u(x 2 ) − u(x 1 ) = u(x 4 ) − u(x 3 ). In other words, u(x 2 ) − u(x 1 ) = u(x 4 ) − u(x 3 ) for all u ∈ U ′ . But then the multiutility representation (3) implies that (x 1 ❀ x 2 ) ≈ (x 3 ❀ x 4 ), as desired. ✷ with their 'reversals' under (DP1). This yields a system of 42 relations, which is closed under the application of (DP2) and (DP3). Thus, it is a difference preorder on X . Note that ( ) cannot compare (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) with (y 0 ❀ y 1 ). However, if ( Also add the (DP1)-reversals of the sets of relations described in (b), (c) and (d) (the set (a) is already closed under (DP1)). Observe that the four relation sets described in (a)-(d) are each separately closed under the application of (DP2) and (DP3). Also, there is no way to combine a relation from one of these sets (e.g. (b)) with one from another (e.g. (c)) using (DP2) or (DP3). Thus, the entire system is closed under (DP2) and (DP3); thus, it is a difference preorder. We claim it is not Szpilrajn. By contradiction, suppose that ( c ) is a complete difference preorder on X which extends and refines ( ). Then (a), (b) and (DP2) imply that (x 0 ❀ x 1 ) ≻ (y 0 ❀ y 1 ). Likewise, (a), (c) and (DP2) imply that (y 0 ❀ y 1 ) ≻ (z 0 ❀ z 1 ). Finally, (a), (d) and (DP2) imply that (z 0 ❀ z 1 ) ≻ (x 0 ❀ x 1 ). Thus, we have an cycle of strict preferences, yielding a contradiction. It follows that ( ) is not Szpilrajn. Thus, ( ) cannot have any strong utility functions.
The interpretation of these counterexamples depends upon whether we believe the incompleteness of ( ) to be epistemic or metaphysical in origin. According to the 'epistemic' account, precise interpersonal comparisons are meaningful in principle; we simply lack the necessary information to make these comparisons in practice. The incomplete difference preorder ( ) reflects our incomplete knowledge of some unknown, complete difference preorder ( * ), which encodes the 'true' interpersonal comparisons. Thus, ( ) should be Szpilrajn. Furthermore, if ( ) is not Dushnick-Miller, then it can and should be extended to its 'Dushnik-Miller completion' , because the extra interpersonal comparisons encoded in this completion must be part of ( * ). According to the 'metaphysical' account, however, certain interpersonal comparisons are not meaningful, even in principle. Thus, there is no reason to expect ( ) to be Szpilrajn.
